Addressing PNP issues precisely: A surgical approach (Part 2)

Dr. de Guzman on item 3 (Appoint Civilians in the Hiring and Promotions Boards): “This solution is a thorny issue. There is an organizational culture in the police that tends to discount civilian participation in policing. The reasons for this unwanted intrusion can be categorized into two dimensions:

1. Civilians are incompetent to judge the potentials and qualities of good officers. Arguments for this dimension comprise such discourses as civilians do not fully appreciate the intricacies and nuances of police work, civilians do not have the capability to judge the ‘fitness’ of a person for police work, or the hiring and promotion processes will be tainted with nepotism.
2.  Civilians are already part of the process. This proposal to include civilians is brushed aside with arguments that Napolcom, as the policy and administrative body consists of civilians. Likewise, elected leaders are involved in the promotion of higher-level officers as some senators and congressmen (n.b.: pardon the non-gender neutral term) are part of the SOPPB (aka promotions board). The assignments of key leaders (e.g. Chiefs of police) are blessed by the civilian authorities (governors, mayors, etc.). Finally, the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) consists of civilians and are there to discipline the police.

“All those counter-arguments may be factual but they are also farcical. On the competency argument, it is a non sequitur that civilians lack the ability to judge qualifications. I think to sort out these competency issues, we should isolate the criteria for hiring and promotion. In any hiring process, there are objective criteria and subjective criteria. Objective criteria might be their age, physical agility, psychological capacity, education, physiological health conditions, and so on. This is not going to be a hurdle for civilians as these criteria are sometimes determined with the aid of objective tests. The subjective criteria are the officers’ temperament, sense of judgment, fairness, respect for authority, and so on. Again, civilians are not incompetent along these lines. They can be educated about qualities of good police officers. Even the so-called mystical criteria for promotion known as service reputation can easily be discerned by civilians. In fact, civilians in the boards can redefine what police service and reputation really mean in the eyes of the public. In effect, civilians in the board can represent the sentiment of the people on what police service should be really like. (On) nepotism… Why do you think we have so many officers who are affiliated by blood or marriage? Hence, the competency argument does not hold.

“The second dimension that the police are already managed by civilian authorities is a simple manipulation of appearances. The PNP chief is part of Napolcom, a lot of DILG secretaries were either former military or police, administrators of the training and educational institutions are former police and military, senators and congressmen are also formerly in the service who are sometimes in the Promotions and Placement Boards. Even the local political leaders are former police or military. So, really the argument about civilians involved in police hiring and promotions is simply not the reality in most places.

“If we want the police to have a true civilian character, let us first have a moratorium on the involvement of the former and current military/police officers until such time that we have reached a stage where the culture and ethos of the police are centered toward service and respect for civilians.

Item 2: “Police civilianization is enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. The militarization of the police during Martial Law was seen as a hindrance to effective police service. Civilianization can be accomplished in two ways. The first is the structuring of the organization resembling the civilian bureaucracy. The other way is to hire civilians into the organization to perform non-operational matters. I would fully endorse the latter but partially support the former.  Let me first discuss the structure before I move into the civilianization of its offices.

“…Form follows function. The main function of the police is to operate on the streets to address crime and disorder. This is where their personnel, education, and training expenses should be more devoted. In effect, the technical, professional, and support services should be kept to a minimum. There is really no need for a motor pool, medical, and technical services to be organic within the organization. These services could be procured in a much more cost-effective and cost-efficient way from other government sector or private entities. The idea of having all these services or units in the organization is taken from the military establishment (therefore, showing again the militarized culture of the police). For the military, these units are necessary as they bring services to those that are under military control or currently under belligerency. Hence, civilian units cannot operate but these services must be brought into those areas. For the police, there is no such need as they operate in areas where civilian agencies are fully operational and accessible. Instead of using their annual budgets on these support units, that budget should be used for operational purposes. This would lessen some of the regular expenses for these support services.

“The second part of this reform effort should be to hire civilians for technical and administrative matters. There is no need for example to have a secretary or a crime analyst to be uniformed personnel. In the national headquarters, we see a lot of ranking officers performing staff work when their operational expertise are much more needed in the field. This is also the reason why I advocate for the flattening of the hierarchy or reducing the ranks so that more personnel are in the field rather than in offices.

“The third part of the reform is where I claim to partially support civilianization. I still would like to see that field operatives be given an exemption from civil service rules. For example, give the uniformed personnel more liberty to claim overtime pay and support incentives for medical and mental health issues. They face a lot of physical, mental, and health hazards that they need to have better support. Make those services free and available, separate from the overtime pay they might receive.

“…I have partially touched on (civilianizing the bureaucracy). When the restructure happens that some administrative and support units have been removed, the next thing is to bring in civilians as part of the bureaucracy. For example, the legal services need not be occupied by uniformed personnel.

“The next part of reform on this aspect is to increase collaboration with other civilian agencies that could assist in police services. In the United States, police services have started to partner with medical and health professionals to deliver better services. For instance, crisis intervention teams have been formed where police personnel have partnered with psychologists for referral of apprehended suspects with mental health issues. These can be done more efficiently with other social services such as counselors and/or social workers.

“Finally, the police should strengthen its community partnerships and services. Having this partnership will foster more respect for both sides. The community will understand the difficulties of police work and they become more cooperative and supportive. Likewise, police would know their community members more and would have more restraint in their aggressiveness during calls for services.”

It is on the first item, “Surgical Solution #1. Remove drugs and gambling enforcement from the police,” where Dr. de Guzman made the “overhauling” proposition items with great precision, especially with reference to policing (he defines it as “the art and science of managing and distributing non-negotiable coercive force by duly constituted authorities”). He penned:

“The police can be corrupted in two ways when police are involved with vice enforcements. The Knapp Commission Report of New York City claimed that there are grass eaters and meat eaters. Grass eaters are those who take advantage of events that they could use their authority for personal gain. We might want to call them opportunistic in nature. Meat eaters are those who actively seek ways to engage in personal enrichment through corrupt activities. Nowhere are these temptations for corruption more pronounced than in vice enforcements. One reason for corrupt engagement is due to the nature of police work where they can operate in secrecy or away from the public eye. Another reason is the questionable reputation of the victims of police corruption. No reasonable drug dealer would file a case of being extorted or robbed by the police.

“(Another way) the police are corrupted is when the criminal enterprise co-opts or provides ‘incentives’ for the police to shield the illegal business or under-enforce or do not enforce the laws.

“To break this culture of corruption, the source of corruption should be taken away.

“Another corrupting factor in the Philippine police system is the bounty system. This problem should have already been obvious to any police administrator who had enough education on police history. This problem was already evident with the notorious history of the thief takers. In the early history of US policing, the thief takers either conspired with the thieves that they would not apprehend them during the robbery and that after a bounty has been placed, they would be captured by the thief takers to partake of the bounty. The other way was for the thief takers who apprehended the thieves would under-declare the recovered items aside from collecting the bounty for their collars. This practice found its way into our system with the Ninja cops phenomenon. Likewise, the hearings in Congress revealed this practice where every one of those involved with the 1-ton drugs incident was scrambling to claim the reward. As public officers, they should not be getting the reward for doing their sworn duty. A commendation or spot promotion might be called for but not the monetary reward. In short, remove the vice enforcement role of the police and reform the reward system. This measure might be temporary and the mandate could be returned when the personnel has been properly indoctrinated to the public service culture and when the necessary infrastructure and safeguards are in place.”

For the Seven Surgical Solutions to flourish, it is imperative that we have an enabling law. Dr. de Guzman points out that these may not be the most effective measures, but they are more viable considering that many Legislative and Executive officials have affiliations within the current system. When we forget the time we spent as hypersensitive fans of Gilas Pilipinas and Miss Universe, that means we may also take time to become reformers more sensitive to the work of the police and the policing system. With every allegation of “sistemang bulok” comes an offer to help institute needed reforms.